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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH by and through its
ROAD COMMISSION; H. J. CORLEISSEN, Chairman, LAY T 0 N
MAXFIELD and LORENZO J.
BOTT, members of the State Road
Commission,
PlaintifL
Appellant)

Case No. 8544

vs.
BRACK HOWARD NOBLE and ANN
C. NOBLE, his wife; ELMO ENGLAND; E. J. HUBER; and PACIFIC NATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants)
Respondent.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondents do not fully agree with the statement
of facts set forth by the Appellants, and to avoid repitition,
will set forth any differences in statement of facts and any
1
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supplemental statement of facts by reference to the witness's
testimony as patterned by the Appellant's brief.
Mr. Richards, the engineer, who had cross-sectioned
the Defendants' property according to good engineering
practice, and who had supervised the drilling operations,
gave his estimates of the quantity and quality of the material both sand and gravel as set forth in appellant's brief.
After Mr. Richards admitted that he did not know the exact
composition of the materials under gound, Mr. Budge asked,
"This gravel business is pretty much like gold
mining, you don't know what is there until you get
there; is that correct?"
and Mr. Richards replied,
"That is right". (R. 212).
On redirect examination, Mr. Richards stated that he had
examined the results of the drilling of 4 holes on Defendants'
property and of a fifth hole placed on the south boundary of
the Defendants' property, and also had examined adjoining
properties on which there had been excavation, (R. 213 and
214) ; and the witness stated that his figures as given, were
conservative, (R. 214). The witness had prepared Exhibit 2,
which is a map of the Defendants' property showing the
sand and gravel pits and showing that the plan of operation
would be to excavate the property immediately East of the
highway for a distance of 190 feet East, only to the level of
the highway, in order to preserve the commercial character
of that property, and then commencing 190 feet East of the
highway the propery could be excavated below the level of
the highway by leaving a one and one-half to one slope to
2
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hold the bank on the commercial property (R. 119); witness
testified that from the drilling of test holes as designated by
the witness, the witness was able to prepare the cross section
showing the sand and gravel materials on the Defendants'
property, and that exhibits 3 and 4 are cross sections prepared by the witness, (R. 117). The witness, Mr. Richards,
testified that he is a partner in the firm of Caldwell, Richards
and Sorensen, and during the course of the past 17 years
has had many occasions to cross section land to determine
quantities and qualities of material, and included among his
clients are Interstate Brick Co. and many municipalities,
(R. 113).
The second witness, one of the Defendants, Brack
Howard Noble, before identifying the colored photos exhibits No. 28 through 41 to which the Appellants objected,
identified Exhibits No. 21 through 27, which are 8 x 10 black
and white photo prints showing the Defendants' home, trailer court, antique shop and surroundings, and these black
and white prints were admitted without objection, (R. 147).
Exhibits 21 through 27 which are the black and white prints
are essentially the same scenes as exhibits 28 through 41,
the colored photos. The witness stated that the colored
photos represented a true picture except for the tinted trees,
(R. 148) and a purplish tint on some objects in the photo.
Jury were given both the black and white prints and the
colored prints to compare in light of the objection of Appellant's counsel that the colored photos did not represent a true
picture. Mr. Noble testified that he had a lease on the tract
of land running 200 feet East of his tract from North Salt
Lake giving him the right to excavate sand and gravel upon
the tract next adjoining his tract on the east, ( R. 159). The
witness testified that he conducted a trailer COlTt business
3
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and antique business along the frontage of the highway for
a depth of about 190 feet East of the highway, (R. 152), and
that the property east of 190 feet from the highway was
used for sand and gravel business, (R. 153), and the witness
made a detailed explanation of each of his uses of the properties namely antique business, trailer court business, and
sand and gravel business, as well as the location of his dwelling. The witness stated that in his opinion, his property,
taking in to consideration the three business uses to which it
was being put and for which it was reasonably adapted was
at least $300,000.00 (R. 163 and 164). Upon cross examination, the witness was shown Appellant's exhibits No. 44
through 50 which are 5 x 7 black and white photo prints,
and the witness acknowledged that the pictures were representative of his property about July 22, 1955, (R. 184). Mr.
Noble testified that of the $300,000.00 value he placed upon
the property, the sand and gravel would be worth about
$200,000.00 (R. 168) ; that the home was worth about
$15,000.00 (R. 178) ; the antique building was worth about
$3,000.00 (R. 179); that the laundry room, etc., for the
trailer courts was worth about $8,000.00 (R. 180) ; that the
sewer system was worth between $4,000.00 and $5,000.00;
the lighting system was worth $2,000.00 (R. 180); and that
the frontage property for a depth of 190 feet East of the
highway was worth $75.00 or $80.00 a front foot (R.190).
The witness stated that he had only had his sand pit open
for 2 years and that the market was rapidly growing (R. 194
and 195).
Don R. Bass, the driller for Boyle Bros. Drilling Co.,
(R. 196), testified that he drilled four holes at places designated by the engineer. That the holes were drilled by use
of a core barrel, (R. 197), which permits the taking of sam4
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pies as the drilling progresses, and the samples so selected
are not contaminated by outside material or material from
other depths, (R. 198) ; the witness then identified exhibits
No. 6 through 16 which were eleven cardboard boxes containing samples of material from each of the four test holes
and each box was divided into compartments containing
material from stated depths in each hole, (R. 199 toR. 201);
upon cross examination, the witness testified that he had
drilled many gravel properties and that all of his drilling
was for the purpose of obtaining samples for examination
and that four test holes drilled upon the Defendant's property were sufficient for finding out what is on the property,
(R. 203) ; that some of the holes drilled were about 40 feet
below the level of the highway, and at no time did the witness encounter water or large boulders, (R. 207). That subsequent drilling on adjoining property 200 feet south of the
Defendant's property, and approximately south of hole No.
1 of exhibit No. 2 he found the same material as on the
Defendant's property, and he inspected recent excavation
made in connection with the road building which shows that
the same material exists throughout the vicinity of holes No.
1, 2 and 3.
Mr. Schoenfeld testified that he had been running sand
and gravel pit operations since 1934 in North Salt Lake, and
during this period has had an occasion to open and develop
three pits, and that he recently had an operation which
joined the Defendants' property on the north side, (R. 217) ;
the witness was well acquainted with the Defendants' property and that the Defendants' property was about the same
as the witness' property, (R. 218); that the type of material
on the witness' property commencing at the highway and
extending East to where the abrutJt hill begins is all straight
5
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sand with no gravel in it at all for a depth of at least 20 to
25 feet below the level of the highway, which was as far as
he had gone; the witness identified material contained in exhibit No. 10 which he stated was what he called muck sand,
and which material was no different from the material on
the witness' own property, (R. 219). The sand material
below did not need any further processing, but the material
on the hill which was sand and gravel could be used as fill
material without processing, but could be used for concrete
if processed, (R. 220); the fine sand which he called muck
sand was in largest demand for asphalt plants, but could
also be used as plaster sand or brick sand as well as for fill
material around special tanks, and sewer jobs, (R. 220);
that the witness sold the fine sand for 75¢ per yard at the
plant site, after loading at a cost of about 10¢ per yard, (R.
221); that the muck sand was worth 25¢ a ton in place, and
the other material would be worth 10¢ a ton in place, (R.
222); the witness stated that the location of the Noble Proerty with respect to highway projects and other use in the
vicinity made the Noble property valuable by the saving in
haulage since hauling costs were from five to ten cents per
ton-mile. The other sources of supply were East Bountiful,
which required about 7 miles more hauling and the point of
the mountain in South Salt Lake County which was even
farther from the market, (R. 225). By reason of the limited
supply and the heavier market for fine sand, the witness
believed that within 3 years there will be no source of supply
from the north of fine sand, and the next closest source
would be the point of the mountain, (R. 226); that the fine
sand delivered at 90¢ per ton would cost 35¢ for loading and
hauling, leaving a gross profit of 55¢ per ton (R. 227). Upon
cross examination, the witness stated that the Defendants'
property was the closest point to the asphalt plants where
6
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most of the muck sand goes, (R. 235); that there is a great
demand for the other fill rna terial for building on the
west side of Salt Lake, all of which must be filled before it
can be built on, (R. 236). Upon redirect examination, (R.
236), the witness stated that he would be willing to pay Mr.
Noble 25¢ a ton for the muck sand in place even though he is
leasing land at 10¢ per ton for the reason that the property
he is leasing at 10¢ a ton requires earth removal, cleaning
and processing, whereas the muck sand on the Noble property is ready for loading. The witness stated that under a
prior lease, he had muck sand in a place similar to the Noble
muck sand for which he was paying 10¢ per ton, but he had
entered this lease in 1947, and at the time he entered the
lease he still had to do the surface stripping (R. 237).
Mr. Joseph P. Howa, the Civil Engineer, testified that
he prepared blue prints of the improvements on the Defendants' property showing the buildings, retaining walls and
other improvements (R. 246). He testified as to the sizes of
the various improvements and the details of their construction
(R. 247-248); and as to replacement costs of the various improvements, and arrived at a total replacement value of
$44,795.00. He was of the opinion that the total depreciation
was $4,000.00 which would make a present value of improvements of $40,795.00, (R.252-253).
Mr. Gaddis testified that he had been engaged in real
estate and investment business for 46 years, (R. 270); that
he appraised the Defendants' property after the improvements had been removed. He appraised the frontage property for a depth of 190 feet at 75 dollars per foot. There being
~'l5 feet frontage he valued that portion of the property at
$44,625.00, (R. 272); then in response to the hypothetical
q .:2stions placed, Mr. Gaddis gave the answers as set forth
7
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in the appellant's brief; on cross examination the witness
stated that while he was not a sand and gravel businessman,
he depended upon experts to support his opinion as to value,
(R. 279).

Mr. Sherman Rideout testified in behalf of the Defendant, (R.280), and stated that he had been in the real estate
business for 27 years; that he appraised the Defendants'
property about a week before the trial date, but the values at
the time of appraisal were about the same as of June 22,
1955, (R. 281); that the witness appraised the frontage
property for a depth of about 200 feet which he considered a
good depth for business property at $75.00 per front foot,
making a total of $44,625.00, (R. 282) ; that as an appraiser,
he must at sometimes base his appraisals upon the professional opinions of others; that assuming the quantity and
quality of sand and gravel stated by the engineer, Mr. Richards, and the value of this material in place as stated by
Mr. Schoenfeld and considering the replacement value of
the property less depreciation as stated by the engineer Mr.
Howa, (R. 283), and having seen pictures of the property
offered in evidence, Exhibits 21 to 41 inclusive, (R. 284)
and having seen the property from the street practically
every month during the past four or five years, and being
generally acquainted with the businesses carried on on the
property, the fair market value of the property was
$270,000.00, (R. 286-287) ; the witness was asked to base
his opinion upon the idea that a fair market value of the
property is what a willing buyer who had the means to do so
and who wasn't under pressure, would pay to a willing seller who desired to sell his property, and wasn't under presure to sell it, (R. 285).
8
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Douglas F. Larsen, the Materials Engineer for the Utah
State Road Commission testified that there was drilled under
his supervision 4 holes, ( R. 322 and 341) ; one of the holes
was drilled with an 18 inch auger which is only capable of
going to a depth of 20 feet, (R. 340); the material obtained
by the drilling was tested for fineness and all of it would
pass through a %, inch sieve, 99.8 per cent would pass a 3fs
inch sieve, (R. 322); the witness testified that materials
passing a No. 40 sieve or smaller would be considered fine
sand, (R. 337); and that 94.3 per cent of the material tested
passed the No. 40 sieve, (R. 323).
The witness, Mr. Knowlton, called by the State as an
expert in sand and gravel classified muck sand as being as
fine as fine dirt, and that blending sand would be somewhat
larger in its grains, (R.343); then upon cross examination,
(R. 357), the witness stated that they acquire their muck
sand from a process as a waste rna terial, and they do not
have any bed of muck sand, so that the material the witness
calls muck sand was just the washout waste from the cleaning of other sands and gravels; that this material which he
called muck sand, he sells for 30¢ a ton loaded on the trucks;
that:
"Q. Is that muck sand you sell for 30 cents a ton
anything like the sand on Noble's property?

A. Well, it is not identical with it by a long ways;
there is some blending sand on Noble's property.
Q. Have you inspected the sand on the property
immediately north of the noble property that was
leased by Schoenfeld?

A.

In a general way. I never made a minute exam9
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ination of it.
Do you know whether there is any difference
between the sand on the property of Schoenfeld and
the Noble's property?

Q.

A. I won't attempt to make an accurate comparative classification.
Well, have you ever examined them to determine whether there is any similarity or difference?

Q.

A.

Yes, I have. That is, certain layers I have.

Now Mr. Schoenfeld testified that the material
on his sand area, that he called muck sand, was the
same as the material found on Mr. Noble's property.
Q.

Would you disagree with him?
A. I think Mr. Schoenfeld is a better authority on
that than I am, Sir."
Mr. Knowlton further testified that the property of Utah
Sand and Gravel is located about a mile and a half southerly from the Noble property and on the East side of Highway 91 (R. 350); that the witness' company excavated along
the East side of Highway 91 to a depth of 40 feet below the
level of the Highway, (R. 352); that the witness had been
buying materials from Foss Lewis pit in Bountiful, which is
about 8 miles away for 10 cents per ton, but this purchase
was made under a 2 year contract which had since expired,
(R. 353); the witness stated that the hauling price is about
5¢ per ton-mile, and that the location of gravel property with
respect to the market is an important item in connection
10
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with determining its value, (R. 359); and that most of the
asphalt producers are located near North Salt Lake at the
present time; that the Noble property is strategically located
with respect to the industrial area of the city, (R. 360); the
witness testified that he had negotiated with Mr. Noble for
the purchase of some material and that the price at which
it was offered was 20¢ per yard, (R. 353), and in declining
to purchase, no objection was made as to the price, but in a
letter, the witness wrote Mr. Noble in part as follows:
"After giving further consideration to this matter, and also the fact that we understand the State
Road Commission is intending soon to obtain right
of way for the highway development in that neighborhood, which will involve this property, we have
decided that it would not be in our best interest to
consider the purchase of any of this material from
you at this time."
The witness stated that he had recently negotiated with the
State of Utah for certain blending sands on property to be
acquired by the State just north of the Noble property, (R.
355), and that he was particularly interested in the blending
sand.
Mr. Kiepe, the appraiser for the State, testified that
the property had a multiple use, and that ultimately its
highest and best use would be to preserve it for commercial
development or industrial development which might properly
expand along U. S. Highway 91, (R. 376); that the portion
of the property which would have best use for business would
be that frontage along the highway for a depth of 200 feet,
(R. 382); that the witness made an estimate of replacement
costs of the improvements to consider in connection with
11
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his estimate of value, (R. 370) and (R. 385); the witness'
opinion as to how much sand and gravel could be economically removed from the property was 286,668 cubic yards, (R.
386), which was considerably less than the 1,299,868 tons
which the engineer calculated, (R. 387); that he did not
consider it economically feasible to excavate below the grade
line of the highway, (R. 387), East of the 200 foot depth;
that the witness made an inquiry as to the value of sand
and gravel and his opinion after inquiry was that the average
price of all the material including sand and gravel was 10¢
per cubic yard in place, (R. 389); and on this basis, the present worth of the sand and gravel is $14,540.00; that when
the buildings were removed an additional $3,150.00 could
be recovered from sand and gravel, (R. 391); that the frontage property would be worth $92.00 per front foot in ten
years from now, and would sell for $45,500.00, but the present worth is $21,075.60 calculated by determining that
the present worth of $45,500.00 ten years from now is
$21,075.60, (R. 391); in summarizing, Mr. Kiepe determined
the total value of the property as follows: (R. 392-393):
a.

Sand and gravel and
overburden
$14,540.00
b. Sand and gravel where
3,150.00
buildings are located
21,075.00
c. Valuue of the land
d. Rental income for 10 years
at $2,700.00 per year; present
18,117.00
cash value
Total
$56,882.00
The witness concluded that the fair market value was
$56,900.00 according to his calculations, (R. 393) (Exhibit
54). Upon cross examination the witness stated that he did
not appraise the home separately, but that he estimated the
12
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replacement cost of the residence at $15,300.00 and a depreciation of $3,060.00, leaving a present replacement cost less
depreciation of $12,240.00 for the residence, (R. 404); that
the witness obtained information on the business conducted
on the premises for the years of 1952 and 1953, but did not
get the figures for 1954 and 1955, (R. 404) ; that the witness
determined the yardage of sand and gravel by using aU. S.
Geological survey map (Exhibit 55) and by use of the contour lines thereon, (R. 406); that on the map (Exhibit 55)
the Noble property is indicated by about one half an inch,
(R. 408); that though the witness said in order to appraise
according to the rules of his organization, he had to do
everything himself, in this instance he relied upon the map
and accepted information from every source he could possibly glean as an appraiser, (R. 410); that the witness did
not cross section the property himself and did no drilling,
(R. 410); that the witness knew what type of material was
on the Noble property "just by what is open", and that he
inspected cuts on the Noble and adjoining properties, (R.
415). As to the price of the sand and gravel, the witness obtained all of his information from other people, (R. 418);
that the witness based his opinion mainly on leases and contracts that were made prior to 1954 or during 1954, (R. 419);
that the witness knew that the great building program was
to begin after 1955, (R. 420); that the witness realizes that
hauling makes a tremendous difference in the price of sand
and gravel and that where hauling costs 5¢ a ton mile, this
becomes an important item, (R. 424); that with respect to
the lateral support since the adjoining properties had a primary use for sand and gravel, the logical way for development of the property and particularly the property to the
East would be to develop it from the Noble property, (R.
431 and 432). The witness stated that he was farniF"1' ,,,'t11
13
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other properties along the highway and the vicinity of the
Noble property, (R. 459); that he was acquainted with the
property of Mayor Stewart, which adjoined the Noble property immediately on the North, (R. 460); that Mayor Stewart's property was subject to a lease in favor of Mr. Schoenfeld for 9lj2 years; and that there was an additional term to
run on the lease of 5 years; (R. 461). The witness identified
a deed from Mayor Stewart to the State Road Commission
for 8.45 acres which showed a consideration of $80,000.00,
(R. 462); that the State, in addition to paying Mayor Stewart $80,000.00 for the land, would still have to pay Mr.
Schoenfeld for the 5 year lease, which Mr. Schoenfeld had on
the sand and gravel, (R. 464) and much of the material had
already been removed from the property. The deed from
Mayor Stewart to the State Road Commission showing consideration of $80,000.00 was offered and admitted in evidence
as Exhibit 56 without objection, (R. 468).
Mr. Solomon, the second appraiser called by the State,
identified Exhibits 43 through 50 which are black and white
prints of pictures taken by him, (R. 475); the witness estimated the quantities of sand and gravel as of July 1955, as
follows:
a.
b.

Overburden
Muck sand

41,127 cubic yards
388,671 cubic yards, (R. 478).

The witness testified that he first established the highest and
best use for the property in which the highest and best use
for the frontage property to a depth of 200 feet is for preservation for business use, and the balance of the property
east of the 200 foot set back had the highest and best use for
the extraction of deposits, (R. 479); that from the witness'
14
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investigation, his opinion was that muck sand was worth 10¢
per cubic yard in place, and overburden was worth 4¢ per
cubic yard in place, and these figures were determined by
checking with operators who were buying and selling such
products, (R.A81); the witness placed a value on the frontage
property at $50.00 per foot to a depth of 200 feet, (R. 486);
he placed a value of $1,250.00 on the right of way 50 feet in
width on the north of the Noble property, (R. 487); the witness computed the cost of replacement of the improvements
of Mr. Noble and allowed depreciation, (R. 488), making
the depreciated value of the improvements $21,827.00, (R.
489); the witness summarized his values of the property as
follows: (R. 483-489),
a.
b.
c.
d.

Frontage
$29,750.00 (but at R.489-$28,750)
Right of Way 1,250.00
Improvements 21,827.00
Gravel area 19,518.00
$72,345.00

The witness concluded that his opinion was that the market
value of the property as of July 22, 1955, was $72,000.00,
(R. 494). The witness further stated that he did not think
the payment of $80,000.00 by the State Road Commission to
Mayor Stewart was an excessive price, (R. 495).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
The Respondents statement of points are in the main
the converse of the statement of points of the Appellant, and
are set forth as follows:

THE

RESPO~ ~DENT

POINT I
SHOWED BY PREPONDERANCE
15
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OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TAKEN WAS AT LEAST $150,000.00 IN SUPPORT
OF THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE JUDGMENT
ENTERED THEREON.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN ALLOWING EXPERTS TO
TESTIFY AS TO THE MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY WHERE THE OPINION OF THE EXPERT WAS
BASED PARTLY ON HIS OWN OBSERVATION AND
PARTLY UPON INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY OTHERS,
NOR WAS IT ERROR TO RECEIVE THE OPINION OF A
WITNESS AS TO THE VALUE OF THE WHOLE PROPERTY BASED IN PART UPON HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN ADMITTING THE COLORED PHOTOS IN EVIDENCE.
POINT IV
IT WAS NOT ERROR TO PERMIT THE JURY TO CONSIDER THE DEFENDANTS EXHIBIT NO. 56 UPON
CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S WITNESS
AS TO FAIR MARKET VALUE.
POINTV
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN REFUSING TO STRIKE THE
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS HOWA AS TO THE
MARKET VALUE OF SAND AND GRAVEL.

16
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POINT VI
THE JURY WAS FULLY INSTRUCTED UPON THE LAW
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AND NONE OF WHICH INSTRUCTIONS WERE OBJECTED TO BY THE APPELLANTS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RESPONDENTS AGREE WITH THE APPELLANTS
CONTENTION THAT THE BURDEN OF SHOWING DAMAGES RESTS UPON THE LAND OWNER, AND THE
JURY WERE SO ADVISED BY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
COURT, (R. 45):
INSTRUCTION NO. 6

"You are instructed that the burden of proving value,
and the burden of proving damages, are burdens which the
law puts upon the defendants. These burdens of proof are
successfully carried by defendants only if you find that
they have established the truth of their contentions by a
preponderance of the evidence.
A "preponderance of the evidence" is defined as that
amount of evidence which is more convincing as to its truth,
or which convinces the mind of the jury that a proposition
is more probably true than not true.
Therefore, if you believe that on a particular value the
evidence is evenly balanced, then that value has not been
proved, anu ~' -P-1 cannot award on that basis. The amount of
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the market value that you find, must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence."
The Utah Statute relative to compensation and damages
and the assessment thereof as applied to a situation where
the entire property is taken is as follows:
"78-34-10. Compensation and damages- How
assessed. - The court, jury or referee must hear
such legal evidence as may be offered by any of the
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
(1) The value of the property sought to be condemmed and all improvements thereon appertaining
to the realty, and of each and every separate estate
or interest therein; and if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each estate or
interest therein shall be separately assessed .... "
All of the witnesses testifying as to the value of the
whole of the property arrived at their estimates by considering three general components of value of the Respondent's
property:
a.

Value of the 595 feet of frontage along the highway
for a depth of about 190 to 200 feet.

b.

Value of the sand and gravel and overburden.

c.

Value of the improvements.

All of the Respondent's witnesses used the computations
made by Mr. Richards, the engineer, in determining the amount of sand and gravel, which figures were:
a.

Fine sand,

355,222 tons.
18
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b.

Sand and gravel mixture,
Total sand and gravel

944,646 tons.
1,299,868 tons.

Mr. Keipe, by his own observation determined that there
were 286,668 cubic yards of sand and gravel, (R. 386). At
this point it should be mentioned that some witnesses use
yardage as measurement, and others use tonnage. Mr.
Schoenfeld, the sand and gravel operator, testified that one
cubic yard of material weights from 2,200 to 3,000 lbs., and
the rule-of-thumb is that 1 yard of material is about 1112
tons, (R. 234). So that Mr. Kiepe's estimate of 286,668 cubic
yards is about 430,002 tons. Mr. Solomon estimated the overburden at 41,127 cubic yards (61,790 tons) and muck sand
of 388,671 cubic yards (583,006 tons), (R. 478), making
about 644,796 tons in all.
As to the value of the sand and gravel material, Mr.
Schoenfeld testified that the fine sand was worth 25¢ per ton
in place, and the remaining material would be worth 10¢ per
ton in place, (R. 222); Mr. Howa stated the value was a minimum of 15¢ per yard for the entire run of material, (R.
268); Mr. Noble testified that the sand was worth 25¢ per
ton in place, and the sand and gravel 15¢ per ton in place,
(R. 171) ; Mr. Knowlton, the sand and gravel man called by
the State testified, that he had bought blending sand from
Foss Lewis in Bountiful, which is about 8 miles away for 10¢
per ton under and old 2 year contract, (R. 353), and that
the hauling price is about 5¢ per ton-mile, and that location
of sand and gravel property with respect to the market is an
important item in connection with determining its value,
(R. 359); Mr. Knowlton classified muck sand as being that
material which is washed off from the washing of his other
sand and gravel materials, but even this washed off muck
19
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sand was sold by him for 30¢ a ton loaded on the trucks, (R.
356) ; Mr. Knowlton admitted that he had negotiated with
Mr. Noble for the purchase of some material at the offered
price of 20¢ per yard, (R. 353), and at no time did Mr.
Knowlton make known to Mr. Noble that the reasons for
discontinuing negotiations was a matter of price, (R. 367),
and the only reason given was as set forth in exhibits 52 and
53 which is in part quoted in the Statement of Facts (supra).
Mr. Kiepe placed a market value of 10¢ per cubic yard for all
of the material in place, (R. 389); Mr. Solomon testified that
the muck sand was worth 10¢ per cubic yard in place,
(R. 481).
In summary, the jury in determining the value of the
sand and gravel had the following testimony:
Respondent's Witnesses:
Fine Sand
Sand & Gravel

355,222 tons @ .25
944,646 tons @ .10
1,299,868 tons

Total

$ 88,805.50
94,464.60
$183,270.10

Mr. Kiepe:
Sand & Gravel

286,668 yards @ .10
$ 28,666.80
( 430,002 tons)
But present cash value $ 17,690.00

Mr. Solomon:
Fine Sand
Overburden

388,671 yards @ .10
41,127 yards @ .04
(644,796 tons)

$ 38,867.10
1,645.08
$ 40,316.08

But present cash value $ 19,518.00
Mr. Kiepe and Mr. Solomon apparently calculated the
20
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amount of material by estimating the amount within a cone
shaped excavation leaving lateral support on four sides and
going to a depth of about the level of the highway, in disregard of the evidence that by agreement and custom the only
lateral support necessary would be that which adjoins the
east side of the 200 foot commercial property. Mr. Knowlton, the Appellant's witness, testified that his firm had excavated to a depth of about 40 feet below the level of Highway 91 in the vicinity of the highway, (R. 352). Mr. Knowlton never did testify as to the market value of the material
in place, but did state that he had been paying 10¢ per ton
for the material at Bountiful, and hauling at a distance of
7 miles greater at a cost of 5¢ per ton-mile, which in itself
was 35¢ per ton for haulage alone in excess of the haul which
would have been required had he purchased the material
from the Noble property, (R. 353 and 359).
The frontage property of the defendants consisted of
595 feet along U. S. Highway 91, together with a 50 foot
right-of-way adjoining thereto, but the latter right-of-way
was not a part of the litigation herein. All of the experts agreed that a good depth for commercial or industrial property would be from 190 to 200 feet East of the highway. As
to the values placed upon the frontage property, the opinions
were as follows:
Mr. Gaddis,

$75.00 per front foot

$44,625.00

Mr. Rideout,

$75.00 per front foot

$44,625.00

Mr. Keipe stated the property would be worth $92.00 per
front foot in 10 years from now making it $54,740, but that
the present worth is $21,075.60. (R. 391).
21
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Mr. Solomon,

$50.00 per front foot

$29,750.00

(R. 486), but (R. 489), he shows the total for the land is
$28,750.00 instead of $29,750.00, (R. 489).
The improvements including the residence on the property had been blue printed in great detail by Mr. Howa, a
Civil Engineer, who determined the replacement costs at a
total of $44,795.00, and that the depreciation on these improvements was $4,000.00, making a replacement value less
depreciation of $40,795.00. Mr. Gaddis and Mr. Rideout in
answer to the hypothetical questions placed to them, stated
that from their general observation of the property during
prior years, and from viewing pictures, and from considering
the testimony of Mr. Howa that the replacement value was
$44,795.00 less $4,000.00 depreciation; that the witnesses
considered these matters in forming their opinion of the value of the whole property.
Mr. Kiepe testified that he had made an estimate of the
cost of replacement of the improvements to check another
method which he uses for valuation, (R. 370 and 385); that
he estimated the replacement cost of the residence at
$15,300.00 and the depreciation of $3,060.00 leaving a present replacement cost less depreciation of $12,240.00 for the
residence, (R. 404); however, rather than place a value on
the improvements as such, the witness under his method of
appraisal determined a rental income for 10 years of the property at $2,700.00 per year which would have a present value
of $18,117.00. Mr. Solomon explained in detail his method of
appraising the value of the improvements, and his procedure
was to estimate the replacement costs and allow a reasonable
depreciation, (R. 489 to 492). Mr. Solomon gave the deprec-
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iated replacement costs of the improvements as follows:

DEPRECIATED
RELACEMENT REPLACEMENT
COST
VALUE
Home (R. 491)
$15,400.00
Antique Repair Shop (R. 492)
Laundry Room (R. 492)
Antique Building (R. 492)
Trailer Court, sewage & power (R. 492)

$10,797.00
1,878.00
1,920.00
3,532.00
3,200.00

Total

$21,267.00

The foregoing total appears to be $21,267.00, but Mr. Solomon had stated a total of $21, 827.00, (R. 492). It is apparent that Mr. Solomon used the figure of $21,827.00 for the
improvements in coming up with his overall total of
$72,345.00, (supra 15). Mr. Solomon endeavored to explain
the difference between fair market value and replacement
cost, and did in fact distinquish between the two, but in
this instance it is obvious that he himself considered the
depreciated replacement cost as the market value.
The court instructed the jury as to evidence of replacement value as follows:
"You have heard evidence of "replacement value". Replacement value is what new buildings would
cost on today' s prices of the same type of rna terials,
or it may be what second-hand buildings of the same
type would cost, if they could be placed on the property. The defendants are not entitled to replacement
values as such.
Depreciation was given to you as the measure of
the extent of the wear and tear on the buildings. De23
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predation is not necesarily the difference between
replacement cost and market value. You may, however, consider replacement costs and the depreciation
figure as elements to be considered in determining
what a willing buyer would have paid for the entire
property, it being sold by a willing seller."
The detailed discussion concerning replacement costs
and its relation to fair market value in the examination and
cross examination of several of the witnesses would seem
to have fully informed the jury that replacement costs can
be considered in determining value, but are not necesarily
conclusive thereof, and the fact that Mr. Solomon, the Appellant's witness, apparently relied entirely upon the depreciated replacement cost method, the jury could well have considered the values placed by Mr. Howa as being more exact
because of his more detailed examination and determination
of costs.
In summary the jury had the following to consider in
connection with determining the fair market value of the
property.
Respondents' witnesses:
Frontage: 595 feet
Improvements:
Sand & Gravel:

@ $75.00

$ 44,625.00
40,999.00
183,269.10
$268,925.10

Mr. Noble testified that his opinion of the market value
of the property was $300,000.00.
Appellant's witnesses:
Mr. Kiepe:
a.

Sand and gravel and overburden

$14,540.00
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b.

Sand and gravel where buildings are
located
c. Value of the land
d. Rental income for 10 years at
$2,700.00 per year

3,150.00
21,075.00
18,117.00
$56,882.00

Mr. Solomon:
a. Frontage
b. Right of Way
c. Improvements
d. Gravel area

$28,750.00
1,250.00
21,827.00
19,518.00
$71,345.00

From the evidence presented, the jury could well have
found the fair market value of the Defendants' property to
be in excess of $268,000.00, but in its determination it considered the value of the property at $150,000.00 which seems to
be fully and amply supported by the evidence.
The Defendants are entitled to have the evidence, and
all reasonable inferences therefrom, considered in the light
most favorable to them. This court has repeatedly held that
if there is any substantial evidence supporting the finding of
the Trier of Fact it will not be disturbed on appeal. Malstrom
v. Consolidated Theatres Inc., 4 Utah 2nd 181, 290 Pacific
2nd 689; Beck v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah 2nd 127, 262 Pacific 2nd
760; and a great number of other cases decided by this court.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN ALLOWING EXPERTS TO
TESTIFY AS TO THE MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY WHERE THE OPINION OF THE EXPERT WAS
BASED PARTLY ON HIS OWN OBSERVATION AND
25
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PARTLY UPON INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY OTHERS,
NOR WAS IT ERROR TO RECEIVE THE OPINION OF A
WITNESS AS TO THE VALUE OF THE WHOLE PROPERTY BASED IN PART UPON HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS.
The procedure followed by the expert witnesses of the
Defendants, was essentially the same procedure followed
by the experts testifying for the Appellants as heretofore discussed, excepting that the experts for the Appellants undertook to determine for themselves certain technical data such as the quantity and quality of material,
and by inquiry from others determined the price or value
of such material. Mr. Gaddis and Mr. Rideout gave their
own observation and in part upon a hypothetical question. The trial court properly instructed the jury in connection with the opinion of experts based upon hypothetical questions as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 24
"Some of the experts in testifying as to the value of all of the Noble property, based their opinions,
in part, upon certain hypothetical questions; that is
to say, their opinion was based upon the information
and findings of others which the expert assumed to
be correct. You are instructed that you give weight
to the opinion of an expert based upon these assumptions, to the extent that the assumptions are supported by a preponderance of the evidence in this
case."
All of the experts acknowledged that the value of the
whole property must be determined by consideration of its
compm~ 'nt parts. The Appellant's witness obtained their
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information on those component parts with which they were
not familiar by inquiry from persons outside of the courtroom, whereas the Respondent's experts based their opinions upon information of other experts which was given in
open court under strict cross examination.
The Appellants cite State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2nd 248,
as opposing the procedure used by the Respondents' expert
witnesses. In that case, the objection was that the experts
assigned the retail value to individual lots in a subdivision
and multiplied the number of lots by the retail value without allowing for any costs; however, no such circumstance
was present in the trial of the subject case since the values
assigned to the various types of sand and gravel were values
of the material in place, and the retail values of said materials were substantially greater as testified by Mr. Schoenfeld and Mr. Knowlton. Mr. Schoenfeld testified that he sold
the fine sand for 75¢ per yard at the plant site after a loading cost of about 10¢ per yard, (R. 221).
The annotation on minerals in land as evidence of value
in 156 ALR 1416 states that with remarkable unanimity the
courts hold that in determining the compensation in eminent
domain proceedings, the existence of valuable mineral deposits in the land taken, constitutes an element which may
be taken into consideration if and insofar as it influences the market value of the land. The reason for the
rule is that the measure of compensation in eminent domain
proceedings is the market value of the land to be condemned
as a whole with due consideration of all the component parts
that make for its value. Then at page 1422 of said annotation, it states that if land containing minerals can be put to
two uses, which are inconsistent, the owner is entitled tore27
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cover for the more valuable use but not for both; but if the
uses are not incompatible, both uses may be considered in
fixing the market value. In the instant case there was no disagreement that the property was conducive to a commercial
use as well as a sand and gravel business.
A well considered federal case dealing with the general
problem of valuating property by considering the valuation
of various part, is the case of Cade V. United States, 213 F.
2nd, 138, U. S. Court of Appeals, 4th Ctr.
The landowner appealed from judgment of the district
court contending the award was inadequate, and that the
court erred in striking testimony of an expert who testified
as to value of the whole of the land after giving valuation to
the various parts, and that the court erred in excluding testimony as to value of a deposit of granite rock on land. In
reversing the cause, the court held in part as follows:
(140) " ..... the trial judge on motion of the government struck out his (expert witness) testimony
on the ground that the overall value to which he
had testified had been arrived at by adding together the values he had placed upon the various
items."
"This, we think, was error."
" ..... The witness testified to the value of the
land as a whole after giving the valuation which he
had placed upon the various parts. This is the way
that any man of intelligence would have arrived at
a valuation of the property for ordinary bus!'1ess
purposes, and we know of no reason why a wit.u2ss
testifying under oath as to his opinions s110 ;\l pf\t
arrive at a valuation in the same way.....
28
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"In United States vs. Wise, 4 Cir., 131 F. 2nd
851 this court held admissible evidence as to reproduction cost of structural improvements on property condemned. . . ."
Quoting from Clark v. United States, 8 Cir. 155 F. 2nd
157, 162 the court said: "We think it was prejudicial not to
permit defendant's witnesses to tell the jury what part of
the value he placed on the timber land and what part on the
rest of the land. In eminent domain proceedings the rule is
that all facts which an ordinary prudent man would take
into account before forming a judgment as to the market
value of property he contemplates purchasing is relevant and
rnaterial. . . . ."
In holding error to exclude the testimony of value of the
granite deposit, the court quoted from National Brick Co.
v. United States, 76 U. S. App. D. C., 329, 131 F 2nd 30,
where the trial court had refused to admit testimony as to
the value of sand on the land:
"This opinion of the Court was, of course, wrong,
for no rule is better established than that the special
value of land due to its adaptability for use in a particular business is an element which the owner is
entitled to have considered in determining the
amount to be paid in just compensation. So much was
said by the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. United
States, 267 U.S. 341. And we know of no other evidence by which the jury could be properly guided in
_ determining the value of the property than to be
told the per ton value of the sand as it lay, or, without this knowledge, how the jury could ever have
reached a judgment based on anything more than
guess or speculation."
(Emphasis added)
29
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A simular result was reached in the case of Early v.
South Carolina Public Service Authority, S.C., 90S. E. 2nd
472, a case in which the appellant by diverting fresh
water caused salt water to flood upon respondent's land.
The respondent called several witnesses, some of whom testified to value of land before and after flooding with salt
water and some of whom testified as to amount of land involved, to which the appellant objected. The court held:
(480)
"There was before the jury evidence in the form
of the plat and the testimony of Mr. McCrady as to
the number of acres involved; and only a simple
mathematical calculation was required to translate
the testimony of these witnesses . . . into the terms
of damage to the whole area involved. The fact that
property taken should be valued as a whole for the
purpose of assessing compensation for the taking
"does not preclude the admission of testimony showing paticular elements of value for consideration
by the jury in arriving at the overall value which
they are required to find as the basis of compensation."
POINT ill
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN ADMITTING THE COLORED PHOTOS IN EVIDENCE.
The Appellants contend that is was error for the
court to admit in evidence exhibits No. 28 through 41
which are enlargements of photographs taken in the colored film; however exhibits No. 21 through 27 are black
and white photo prints of essentially the same scenes as the
colored pictures and both the black and white prints and
the colored photos were offered by the Respondents for
30
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consideration of the jury at the same time. These exhibits
were identified by Mr. Noble who under cross examination
admitted that the photos were a true picture except for the
tinted trees and some purplish tint on objects in the photo,
(R. 148). The jury were also given exhibits No. 43 through
50, which were black and white prints of pictures taken
by Mr. Solomon, (R. 475). The jury was given every opportunity to compare the colored photos with those black
and white ones, and as stated by Mr. Gaddis, the colored
photos are no more or less a true representation than the
black and white photos, but are representative.
The main objection of the appellants to the colored
photos seems to be that they are misleading, and on this
point Whigmore on evidence, Vol. III, section 792, page
185 states:
"Occasionally a Court is found excluding a
photograph as being misleading; but this is begging
the very question which the jury have to decide; it
would be as anomalous as if the judge were to order
a witness from the stand because he was believed by
the judge to be lying."
In view of the lengthy cross examination concerning
the colored photos, and that the jury had an opportunity to
compare the colored and black and white photos as well as to
view the premises, it appears clear that the court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing the colored photos to be admitted in evidence.
POINT IV
IT WAS NOT ERROR TO PERMIT THE JURY TO CON31
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SIDER THE DEFENDANTS EXHffiiT NO. 56 UPON
CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S WITNESS AS TO FAIR MARKET VALUE.
Mr. Kiepe was the Appellant's witness who was being
cross examined by the Respondent. Mr. Kiepe stated that
he had checked the sales of all land in the vicinity of the
Noble property and he knew what they sold for, (R. 459);
that he was well versed in prices which had been paid for
properties along that highway. Mr. Kiepe was then asked if
he knew what the Valentine property sold for, and then
whether he appraised Mayor Stewart's property which was
immediately North of the Noble property, and he replied
that he had so appraised the Stewart property, (R. 460);
that the sale-by lVIayor Stewart to the State Road Commission was a negotiated sale, (R. 463); that in paying Mr.
Stewart $80,000.00 for the tract which was subject to a lease
with 61;2 years remaining, (R. 465) the State paid too much
for the Stewart land, (R. 466). Then the deed from Mayor
Stewart to the State Road Commission was marked as Exhibit 56, and was admitted in evidence without objection.
(R. 468); nor did the appellant object to any of the cross
examination in this connection; furthermore on redirect
examination of Mr. Kiepe, the Appellants undertook a detailed examination concerning the sale of the Stewart property to the State Road Commission, (R. 469). On direct examination by the Appellant of Mr. Solomon, (R. 494), Mr.
Solomon stated that he appraised the Stewart property; that
the witness appraised the Stewart Property for $80,000.00,
and that this was not an excessive price, (R. 495) ; that the
Stewart property had 1325 feet or so frontage as compared
with 595 feet of frontage on the Noble property, (R.495). It
;~s to be noted at this point that the Stewart property was
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subject to a lease having about 6¥2 years remaining in favor
of Mr. Schoenfeld who had the right to remove the sand
and gravel therefrom, and the $80,000.00 was only a payment for the fee subject to said lease.
The Appellant cites the case of Weber County et al. v.
Ritchie, App. Br. 27 as authority that the court erred in permitting the jury to consider Exhibit No. 56. However, that
case is distinguished from this one in two important particulars:
First, in that case the evidence was offered in direct
examination by the land owner whereas in the instant case,
the testimony was on cross examination of Mr. Kiepe by
Respondent and direct examination of Mr. Solomon by the
Appellant.
~

Secondly, in the Weber County case a more serious objection to the testimony of similar sales was that the particular sale which it was sought to introduce in evidence included not only sale price but damages as well.
This court in the case of State vs. Peek, 1 Utah 2nd,
263, 265 Pacific 2nd, 630, held that the price paid for similar
lands is admissible in evidence both on direct examination
and cross examination. While the Peek case does not pass
directly upon the question as to whether or not evidence as
to the price paid by condemner for similar property is admissible, yet the court's opinion would seem to indicate that
upon cross examination of a witness as to his opinion of value of property as long as it tends to disclose the truth, the
inquiry should be allowed and should never be curtailed or
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California, in the case of the City of Los Angeles v.
Cole, 170 Pacific 2nd, 928 while holding that the price paid
by the condemner for other property is not a proper basis
for determining market value, further commented (Page
933) as follows:
"(10) Nor does the record sustain appellants' objection that these instructions were prejudicial because in their statement of the law they did not contain the additional rule announced in the Brizzolara
case supra 100 Cal. at page 437, 34 P. at page 1084,
that while evidence of the character specified is not
admissible as evidence in chief, such evidence is admissible by way of cross-examination "for the purpose of testing the fairness or honesty of an opinion
which the witness may have given upon his direct examination, in relation to the value of the property involved in the action." As heretofore noted in the
present action such testimony was permitted on
cross-examination of respondent's witness, and in a
separate instruction the court advised the jury as to
the propriety of their taking such testimony into consideration for the aforsaid limited purpose-its impeaching effect. Reclamation District No. 730 v.
Inglin, 31 Cal. App. 495,500 160 P. 1098 and cases
therein cited."
In this case no objection having been made to the trial
court concerning Exhibit 56; and Mr. Kiepe having been
confronted with this matter on cross-examination with the
full opportunity to explain his appraisal and opinion of the
transaction; and the fact the the Appellants on direct examination of Mr. Solomon elicited from Mr. Solomon the testimony that the Stewart property was appraised by Mr. Solomon for $80,000.00 and that he thought it was a fair price,
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(R.495) there could have been no error committed in connection with the introduction of Exhibit 56.
POINT V
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN REFUSING TO STRIKE THE
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS HOWA AS TO THE
MARKET VALUE OF SAND AND GRAVEL.
The Appellants quote in their brief only part of the
testimony of Mr. Howa relative to his knowledge of the value
of sand and gravel. Commencing at R. 258 and continuing
toR. 268, the record shows that the Appellants cross examined Mr. Howa at length, and he testified that he was a
building contractor as well as an engineer and estimator;
that he had purchased about 5,000 yards of sand and gravel
and concrete aggregate last year; that he determined the
price of sand and gravel by calling firms such as Utah Sand
& Gravel or Gibbons and Reed, (R. 267); that the witness
realized that the construction of a plant for processing the
sand and gravel would be necessary, and that the witness
had built a sewage plant where the cost of washing sand
for baffle was a part of his experience, and he took all of
these matters into consideration in determining the value
of the sand and gravel on the Noble property. Then when
asked by Mr. Budge what he thought the material was
worth in place, the witness stated that he would give for
sand and gravel in place a minimum of 15¢ per yard, (R.
268). Mr. Howa had considerably more background in sand
and gravel, than did the witnesses Mr. Solomon and Mr.
Kiepe, who were presented by the Appellants as experts for
the purpose of appraising sand and gravel property. Mr.
Kiepe and Mr. Solomon both testified that they obtained
their information ·upon the price of sand and gravel by
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making inquiry from various operators, while Mr. Howa in
addition to this procedure of inquiry had himself been experienced in purchasing and dealing with these products as
a builder and engineer as well as estimator.
The Appellant cites Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First
National Bank Bldg. Co., 89 U 456, 57 Pacific 2nd, 1099.
This was a case where the plaintiff sought damages for the
removal of what was a party wall situation, and the witness
Richards was called as an expert on the difference between
the value of the building before and after demolition of the
partition wall. Comments 17 to 34 deal with this proposition
and the Appellants quoted only a part of what was there
said by the court. The court further held "The matter of
determining the qualification of a witness to testify as to
value rests largely in the discretion of the court. City of
Geneseo v. Schultz, 257 Ill. 273, 100 N.E. 926. The discretion
exercised will not be disturbed except for palpable error."
This court held in the case of Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Co. v. Schramm et al., 56 Utah 53, 58, 189 Pac. 90,
regarding opinion evidence as follows:
"In cases like the one under consideration the
qualification of witnesses to express an opinion as
to market value necessarily is a question to be largely determined by the trial judge. If it is shown that
the witness is competent to express an opinion as to
values, no matter what the source of the qualifying
information may be, he should be permitted to testify. The sources of the witnesses' information may
vary according to the peculiar means or opportunity
the witness has of forming an opinion and judging
the premises. We do not think any good reason can
be assigned why a l-tl'son who has occupied and used
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the premises all her life, and has been interested and
alert in making inquiry as to its value, may not be as
well qualified to speak as the banker, lawyer, or
real estate man, having more or less to do with the
sales and transfers of real property. The means and
extent of the knowledge of any witness may be gone
into on cross-examination, and rebutted by the testtestimony of other competent witnesses, whose opinions may differ as to value. No rule can be formulated for determing the means by which a witness
shall acquire the necessary knowledge to qualify him
to speak that will apply in all cases. If, under all the
circumstances, he was in a position to obtain knowledge and form a correct judgment as to values,
whether or not by buying, selling, leasing, or using
the property for purposes for which it is adaptable
is immaterial, so long as the jury is given the benefit
of the facts upon which the opinion of the witness
is based. Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 46
Utah, 203, 148 Pac. 439; Montana Ry. Co. v. Warren,
137 U.S. 348, 11 Sup. Ct. 96, 34 L. Ed. 681; 2 Lewis,
Eminent Domain (3d Ed.) section 656."
This holding was also followed in the case of Provo River
Water Users Association v. Carlson 103 U 93, 133 Pacific 2nd 777, at page 782, and the court further stated "The
limited experiences of the witness might tend to depreciate the weight of their testimony, but it would not make
them incompetent to testify if they were acquainted with
land values."
POINT VI
THE JURY WAS FULLY INSTRUCTED UPON THE LAW
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AND NONE OF WHICH INSTRUCTIONS WERE OBJECTED TO BY THE APPELLANTS.
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The jury was fully instructed by the court in the matter
of determining the amount of compensation due the Defendants, (R. 41-59). By Instruction No. 3, the court instructed
the jury that they are to determine the fair market value
as of July 22, 1955, of the property taken by the State.
The following instructions or excerpts from instructions
are quite pertinent:
INSTRUCTION NO. 7
"Your are not to consider what the property was
worth to the defendants for speculation, or merely
for possible uses, nor what they claim it was worth
to them, nor can you consider what it may be worth
to plaintiff for highway purposes, nor what the property would bring at a forced sale, you are not to consider the price the property would sell for under
special or extraordinary circumstances, but only its
fair market value on July 22, 1955, if offered in the
market under ordinary circumstances for cash, a
reasonable time being given to make the sale."
INSTRUCTION NO. 8
"It is your sworn duty to fix the just compensation due defendants in accordance with the evidence given in this case, being guided by the legal
definition of that term, and by the rules of law which
the Court will give you in these instructions. You are
bound by your oaths to receive the law as it is laid
down by the Court, even though it may not accord
with your own view as to what the law is or should
be."
INSTRUCTION NO. 9
"You are instructed that defendants are entitled
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to just compensation on account of the taking of
their property. It is the duty of the jury to determine what amount of money will constitute just
compensation, as that term is defined in these instructions.
I~

In this case, "just compensation" is the fair
market value of the property taken from defendants."
INSTRUCTION NO. 10

1

~

~~

"As to the meaning of "Market Value", the
market value of property taken for public use is the
price estimated in terms of money which the propperty would bring if offered for sale in the open
market with a reasonable time allowed in which to
find a purchaser, buying with the knowledge of all
the uses and purposes to which it was adapted and
for which it was capable; or as otherwise state, it is
the price the property will bring when offered for
sale by one who desires, but is not required, to sell,
and is sought by one who has the cash, and who desires, but is not required, to buy, after due consideration of all the elements reasonably affecting
value."
INSTRUCTION NO. 11

"It would be unjust to the public that the State
should be required to pay the defendants more than a
fair market value for the loss they sutain by the appropriation of their property for the general good."
INSTRUCTION NO. 12

"The term "just compensation" means "just"
not only to the party whose property is taken for
public use, but also "just" to the public which is to
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pay for it."
INSTRUCTION NO. 20
"The defendants were entitled to sell the land
and buildings on the theory that said land could be
used for the best and most profitable purpose or
purposes, for which it was adapted. They could have
sold it on the theory that it was usable for several
purposes, but you must consider or assume that the
entire tract of land, including the frontage, trailer
courts, antique store, and the sand and gravel deposits, would have sold to one man for whatever
use or uses he could make of it.
You may not consider uncertain, remote or speculative, or imaginary uses, but only those elements
which give the property a market value, or which
reduce its market value. One way to do it would be
to suppose a sale by a willing seller to a willing buyer, neither one being forced into the transaction, the
buyer having the money to buy, and then determine
what he would have paid for it in the light of all of
the evidence in this case."
INSTRUCTION NO. 23
"The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit
the opinion of a witness to be received as evidence.
An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert
witnesses. A person who, by education, study and experience has become an expert in any art, science
occupation or profession, and who is called as a witness, may give his opinion as to any such matter in
which he is versed and which is material to the case.
You should consider such expert opinion and should
weight the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not
bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the
weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that
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be great or slight, and you may reject it, if, in your
judgment, the reasons given for it are unsound."
CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing review, we are of the opinion that
the evidence fairly and reasonably adduced at trial would
have supported and justified a verdict and judgment of nearly twice the amount entered, and the verdict and judgment
below should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for Respondents
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